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Preface 
The primary goal of the ILO is to work with member States towards achieving full 
and productive employment and decent work for all. This goal is elaborated in the ILO 
Declaration 2008 on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization,1 which has been widely 
adopted by the international community. Comprehensive and integrated perspectives to 
achieve this goal are embedded in the Employment Policy Convention of 1964 (No. 
122), the Global Employment Agenda (2003) and – in response to the 2008 global 
economic crisis – the Global Jobs Pact (2009) and the conclusions of the Recurrent 
Discussion Reports on Employment (2010 and 2014). 
The Employment Policy Department (EMPLOYMENT) is engaged in global 
advocacy and in supporting member States in placing more and better jobs at the centre 
of economic and social policies and growth and development strategies. Policy research 
and knowledge generation and dissemination are essential components of the 
Employment Policy Department’s activities. The resulting publications include books, 
country policy reviews, policy and research briefs, and working papers.2 
The Employment Policy Working Paper series is designed to disseminate the main 
findings of research on a broad range of topics undertaken by the branches of the 
Department. The working papers are intended to encourage the exchange of ideas and to 
stimulate debate. The views expressed within them are the responsibility of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent those of the ILO. 
 
 
Azita Berar Awad 
Director 
Employment Policy Department 
 
 
 
                                                         
1 See http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/mission-and-objectives/WCMS_099766/lang--en/index.htm 
2 See http://www.ilo.org/employment 
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Foreword 
The slow and uneven pace of economic and employment recovery since the 2008 
global financial crisis highlights the need to reconsider macroeconomic policy thinking. 
There is a need to find policies that are more pro-employment, ensuring fast, inclusive 
and sustainable economic growth. This is all the more important in view of developed 
and developing countries’ commitment to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), especially Goal 8 “to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, 
employment and decent work for all”.  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has been working on pro-employment 
macroeconomic policies for a number years, assisting member States’ efforts towards 
decent work and productive employment for all. Constituents asked the ILO to identify 
pro-employment macroeconomic policy frameworks, notably in the 2003 Global 
Employment Agenda, the 2008 ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization and the 2009 Global Jobs Pact. More recently, the 2014 International 
Labour Conference Conclusions concerning the Second Recurrent Discussion on 
Employment specifically called for assistance to policies that “support aggregate demand, 
productive investment and structural transformation, promote sustainable enterprises, 
support business confidence, and address growing inequalities” (ILO, 2014: 7(a)).  
This paper challenges the ideological and empirical basis of the “New Consensus” 
to macroeconomic policy, which advocates limited government intervention to correct 
short-term deviations from the growth path constrained by a rules-based framework. 
Based on the recent experience of the United States and the Economic and Monetary 
Union of the European Union (EMU), the paper argues that the New Consensus has 
yielded a policy stance that is excessively “hands off”, slow to respond to economic 
downturns, and has led to premature austerity, all of which have stifled the recovery. 
This provides lessons for not only developed countries, but also developing and 
emerging economies seeking to design macroeconomic policy frameworks to cope with 
the economic cycle and spillovers from the globalized economy. 
This paper was authored by Professor Francesco Saraceno, Deputy Department 
Director at the French Observatory on Economic Conditions (Observatoire français des 
conjonctures économiques - OFCE) at Sciences Po in Paris, and member of the Scientific 
Board at the LUISS School of European Political Economy in Rome.  
 
Sukti Dasgupta 
Chief 
Employment and Labour Market Policies Branch 
Employment Policy Department  
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Abstract 
This paper gives an assessment of the current state of the debate on fiscal policy 
effectiveness. I begin with an account of the theory of fiscal policy, and how it has 
evolved from the pre-Keynesians to the emergence of a “New Consensus” that 
dominated theory (and policy-making) until the crisis of 2008. Fiscal policy, a critical 
underpinning behind the full employment policies of the Post-WWII period, was 
removed from the policy-makers’ toolbox by the New Consensus, and preference given 
to rules over discretion in government interventions. 
The paper then highlights how the Economic and Monetary Union of the European 
Union (EMU) is an incarnation of the New Consensus, and argues that this had a rather 
negative impact on the growth performance of the Eurozone. The Stability and Growth 
Pact, the EMU fiscal rule, is then dissected to conclude that it is far from optimal even if 
it was never really applied. The paper then shows how the crisis has shaken the 
Consensus, and is leading to a reassessment of the utility of fiscal policy. 
Key words: Fiscal rules, fiscal policy, EMU, multipliers, history of economic 
thought, United States 
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1. Introduction 
In the 1990s, the debate among macroeconomists settled on a “‘new consensus” that 
depicted the economy as fluctuating around a natural growth rate, essentially determined 
by the supply side of the economy. Demand factors (savings, investment, fiscal and 
monetary policy) could only have an impact in the short run, when the economy was 
away from the natural rate - the rate at which the economy would converge in the 
medium-to-long run. 
The crisis has shaken this consensus, to the point that the former IMF chief 
economist Olivier Blanchard is thoroughly revising his best-selling undergraduate 
textbook to take into account the insights gained from the deepest recession in advanced 
economies since the 1930s (Blanchard, 2016). This reassessment may have a strong 
impact on our understanding of how macroeconomic policy impacts on growth and 
unemployment, and lead to a different consensus on the best institutional framework for 
advanced and developing economies. 
This paper gives an account of the ongoing discussion, with a particular emphasis 
on fiscal policy, which the New Consensus had eliminated from the policy maker’s 
toolbox. I will first see (Section 2) how the current Consensus has its roots in the debate 
between Neoclassical and Keynesian economists that characterized the twentieth century. 
I will show how the Consensus represents a substantial rejection of Keynesian views, and 
how it concludes in favour of strong constraints on macroeconomic policy, and in 
particular in favour of fiscal rules (Section 2.3.1). Sections 3 and 4 will then take the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe as a case study. After showing that the 
EMU has been consistently performing worse than the United States, I will argue that 
macroeconomic policy inertia – a consequence of its institutional setting – may go a 
good deal in explaining the differences in performance. In Sections 5 and 6, I will then 
discuss macroeconomic policy after the crisis, and draw some conclusions on advanced 
as well as on emerging and developing economies. 
2. The role of macroeconomic policy: A century-old debate 
In his (1962) Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn defines a paradigm 
as a “Constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and group commitments shared by 
members of a given community, founded in particular on a set of shared axioms models 
and exemplars” (p. 175). Kuhn argues that at any given moment in time there exists a 
dominating paradigm providing the conceptual framework within which scientific 
advances take the form of refinements of the paradigm itself (the “normal science”). 
Sometimes new facts appear that are incompatible with the existing dominant paradigm, 
therefore requiring a new framework. The adoption by the scientific community of a new 
paradigm is a scientific revolution. Kuhn explains scientific progress as the succession of 
paradigms, each of them becoming the “mainstream” when the previous one proves 
incapable of explaining new phenomena. 
At the price of some simplification, the debate on economic policy during the 
twentieth century can be seen as the struggle between two paradigms, (i) the Neoclassical 
and (ii) the Keynesian schools, that yield radically different conclusions on the role of 
markets and governments respectively in ensuring that the economy reaches the optimal 
equilibrium. We will see that, consistently with Kuhn’s framework, each of these 
paradigms was supplanted when it came across phenomena that would not fit within its 
framework. 
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The very specific focus on macroeconomic policy explains why many streams of 
research, that cannot be associated with either the neoclassical or the Keynesian schools, 
were left out of this section: it does not have any pretense to be exhaustive. 
2.1 The birth of macroeconomics: Keynes vs the Classics 
2.2.1 The Neoclassical School 
The beginning of the Neoclassical theory dates back to the second half of the 
nineteenth century, in opposition to the classical school. The tumultuous development of 
scientific discoveries constitutes the background against which the Neoclassical School 
moved its first steps. 
The pillars: The scientific method and methodological individualism  
From its beginning, with Jevons (1871), Menger (1871), and Walras (1874), the 
neoclassical theory has been rooted in two methodological pillars that, given the extreme 
variegation of successive developments of the theory, may be seen as the main elements 
that Neoclassical economists have in common: the first is methodological individualism, 
and the second the scientific method. 
The concept of methodological individualism has quite obviously been the subject 
of considerable controversy among philosophers, economists and sociologists1. For our 
rather general purposes it suffices to take its most common definition, as the claim that 
the rational agent (the Homo Œconomicus) is the ultimate starting point to analyse the 
behaviour of societies that do not exist above or beyond the individuals who compose 
them. All social sciences should therefore study aggregate behaviours as the simple 
aggregation of individual decisions and actions. There is no role for the so-called 
emergent properties, i.e. for the dynamics generated by social interaction. 
The scientific method in its simplest definition is the three-step process by which (1) 
a theory is constructed starting from first principles; (2) normative and positive 
conclusions are drawn from this theory; and finally (3) through a process of empirical 
falsification, the theory is compared to the facts that the theory was meant to explain. The 
scientific method is a pillar of natural sciences, like physics and chemistry that 
blossomed in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is therefore embraced by 
economists that try to “clean” their discipline from its social connotation, thus building it 
on laws of nature that are not affected by historical and social conditions: 
In the closing quarter of the last century, great hopes were entertained by economists 
with regard to the capacity of economics to be made an “exact science”. According to the 
view of the foremost theorists, the development of the doctrine of utility and value had laid 
the foundation of scientific economics in exact concepts, and it would soon be possible to 
erect upon the new foundation a firm structure of inter- related parts which, in definiteness 
and cogency, would be suggestive of the severe beauty of the mathematico-physical 
sciences. (Moore, 1914: pp. 84-85) 
Neoclassical economists move from the notion of maximization to derive a number 
of individual behavioural rules (supply and demand) for all economic agents. The Homo 
Œconomicus maximizes his utility by equating at the margin the costs and benefits of 
any given action, starting from a set of first principles such as tastes or technology. In the 
                                                         
1 For a discussion of different uses of the term, see Hodgson (2007); and for a critique, Kirman (1992). 
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benchmark neoclassical model, agents take their decisions in perfectly competitive 
markets. 
Representative agents maximize their utility, under a number of constraints. The 
theory usually assumes that goods can be substituted for each other in the consumption 
bundle of consumers, and likewise production can be obtained with different 
combination of production factors. Thus, given the prices they observe, consumers and 
firms will compose bundles (of consumption goods or of production factors) that 
maximize their utility. This maximization yields individual demands and supplies (of 
goods, of labour and capital, and so on). Demands and supplies for society at large, then, 
simply result from the aggregation of the choices by the representative agents. 
A meta-agent (the “auctioneer”, see Walras (1874)) is then invoked to mimic the 
functioning of markets that adjust prices in order to absorb disequilibria that may arise at 
any given price. Excess demand (supply) of a good will lead to an upwards (downwards) 
adjustment of its price by the auctioneer. Once this tâtonnement (“trial and error”) 
process is over, and prices in all markets are at equilibrium, transactions can take place. 
Thus, trade never happens at disequilibrium prices. 
Market efficiency and full employment  
The Neoclassical theory is characterized by two main theoretical results that have 
shaped the field of economics to our days: 
1.   Existence - First, under rather general conditions (mostly on the shape of utility and 
profit functions), it can be proved that a vector of prices exist such that all markets 
clear. Said differently, the tâtonnement process described above will eventually lead 
the auctioneer to announce a set of prices such that in each market the sum of 
individual demands is equal to the sum of individual supplies. This result was first 
obtained by Walras (1874). 
2.   Optimality - Second, under a number of hypotheses on the functioning of markets, 
such an equilibrium is “Pareto efficient”, meaning (broadly speaking) that no one 
can be made better off without someone being made worse off. While a Pareto 
efficient equilibrium may not be socially desirable (e.g. in terms of fairness), a 
second result states that any Pareto efficient allocation may be reached by markets 
after an appropriate redistribution of initial endowments. These two result go under 
the name of “Fundamental Welfare Theorems” first proposed by Vilfredo Pareto 
(1896). 
The conditions for efficiency to be attained boil down to the absence of rents and 
market frictions. One such rigidity is market power. Absent perfect competition, 
monopolists (or oligopolists) can take advantage of their position to extract rent from 
consumers, thus moving the economy away from its Pareto optimum. For the same 
reason, agents should not have informational advantages (for example on the quality of a 
good they sell), because this informational asymmetry would also lead to extracting rent 
from the exchange. In a famous paper George Akerlof (1970) showed that the existence 
of “lemons” in a market characterized by asymmetric information may lead to the 
withdrawal from the market of the owners of good quality goods, thus leading to the 
collapse of the market itself. 
Besides the absence of rents, the optimality of market allocation also requires the 
absence of rigidities (like missing markets, price stickiness and so forth), that would 
prevent convergence to the Pareto optimal equilibrium. 
The general principle that price variations will ensure that the demand and supply of 
any good eventually converge is, for our purposes, particularly important concerning the 
labour market. In that market, real wages will change until labour demand and labour 
supply are equal. Labour supply, more specifically, stems from workers’ choice between 
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leisure and income. Under fairly standard conditions wages eventually reach the level at 
which labour supply and demand are equal. In the Neoclassical equilibrium, all 
unemployment is voluntary. 
Macroeconomic equilibrium and Say’s Law  
Once wage flexibility brings about full employment equilibrium in the labour 
market, the prevailing technological conditions allow to determine the amount of goods 
that the economy is capable of producing, what today would be called potential output. 
The Neoclassical theory rests, then, on the well-known Say’s Law (Say, 1803); the law is 
nothing else than the simple and trivial principle that the very fact of producing and 
selling a good generates an income for the factors involved in the production process, 
and this in turn generates a corresponding demand of the same value for other goods. 
Within the Neoclassical framework, nevertheless, Say’s Law leads to the result – 
which is not trivial at all – that prices will move in such a way that an amount of demand 
corresponding to the full employment equilibrium production will be always be 
generated: in markets free from frictions and rents, demand will always “adapt” to full 
employment output. 
If we look at the economy as a whole, Say’s Law takes a very specific form, which 
is that investment decisions always adapt to savings decisions. Most of the controversies 
on macroeconomic equilibrium and the role for economic policy may in fact be seen as 
different views on how savings and investment come to become equal. The decision of 
firms to invest depends on the interest rate: either directly, when firms seek funding from 
a financial institution or on bond markets; or indirectly, because the interest rate is an 
opportunity cost. 
Savings will also depend on the interest rate, as the decision to save is a decision to 
postpone consumption, and therefore entails a cost that is balanced against the 
remuneration of savings. The interest rate is therefore the price that allows the levels of 
investment and savings to equalize. 
Thus, the macroeconomic equilibrium in the Neoclassical model is reached in two 
logically separated steps: (i) wage flexibility allows to reach an equilibrium wage at 
which all workers willing to work will be able to find a job. Then, (ii) revenues will yield 
consumption, that absorbs part of the production, and savings, that in the market for 
loanable funds will be channeled into investment. This will ensure that demand absorbs 
all full employment production2. 
Thus Say’s Law, together with the Neoclassical assumptions of representative agent 
optimization and wage and price flexibility, yields convergence to the full employment, 
Pareto optimal equilibrium. 
The (limited) role of policy  
The existence and optimality theorems were the backbone of the Neoclassical theory 
as it developed until the late 1920s. As such, the theory leaves very little space for 
macroeconomic policy: representative agents’ maximization will determine demand and 
supply of goods; price variations will ensure that the economy converges at the 
equilibrium in which each good’s demand and supply coincide. If the economy is unable 
                                                         
2 These two logically separated steps collapse, in a general equilibrium setting, into a simultaneous 
determination of equilibrium prices and quantities in all markets. 
 5 
 
to generate enough investment to absorb all savings, interest rate variations will take care 
of ensuring that savings and consumption are matched. 
These mechanisms work without external interventions: markets, if left free to 
operate without distortions, tend to converge to the optimal equilibrium. If on the other 
hand, markets fail to spontaneously head to equilibrium, this is because some agents in 
the economy are in position to extract rents from the market process. We saw above that 
this happens when markets are not competitive or if some agents have an informational 
advantage over others. 
The existence of a Pareto superior equilibrium to which the market economy 
spontaneously tends once the appropriate conditions are met has a very strong policy 
implication: governments need not to tamper with the economy. In terms of the national 
accounting identities, the equality between investment and savings yields that 
government savings need to be zero: there is no need for government intervention aimed 
at correcting market disequilibria, or at moving away the economy from a sub-optimal 
equilibrium. The only effect of government expenditure, and of taxation, is to get in the 
way of market adjustments, and to introduce distortions in the decision process of agents. 
A crucial corollary of the Neoclassical framework is that money, whose intrinsic 
utility is zero, is only demanded because it reduces the transaction costs of exchange. 
It stems from this corollary that money is neutral, i.e. that it has no impact on the 
real sector, and only affects prices and inflation through Irving Fisher’s quantity equation 
(Fisher, 1911), linking the quantity of money in circulation with the total value of 
production: if total production is determined by the equilibrium in the labour market, 
there is no reason why a change in the quantity of money available would change the 
choice of consumers between goods, or between goods and leisure. 
The Neoclassical system is therefore dichotomous: the fundamentals of the economy 
determine the quantities produced and relative prices, while the quantity of money and 
credit institutions determine the general price level (inflation). Monetary policy is 
therefore, like fiscal policy, ineffective in affecting the activity level of the economy. The 
central bank needs to steer it so that the quantity of money available for exchanges 
follows the evolution of the real economy, so that inflation is constant. 
But if macroeconomic policy is ineffective – if not outright harmful – does this 
mean that the government has no role to play in the economy? Not really. Very few 
Neoclassical economists would argue that we are close to the Walrasian ideal world3. 
The main role for economic policy then is to shape economic institutions in such a way 
that markets can work in an environment that is as close as possible to the ideal 
Walrasian world. Governments need to implement, to use a modern term, “structural 
reforms” that remove barriers to free competition (monopolies, asymmetric information, 
wage and price rigidities). If reforms are successful, and the real world becomes 
sufficiently close to the Walrasian ideal, then governments can take the back seat and 
observe markets converge to the optimal equilibrium path. 
The Great Depression and the crisis of the Neoclassical paradigm 
When discussing scientific revolutions, the already cited Kuhn (1962) argues that 
dominating paradigms tend to increase their field of application until they hit their own 
                                                         
3 Two of the economists more closely linked with the development of general equilibrium theory, Walras 
himself and Kenneth Arrow, were famously concerned with market imperfections and with the role of 
government in compensating for them. 
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boundaries: an empirical challenge to the paradigm appears when it is confronted with 
some event that is impossible to explain through normal science, i.e. through refinements 
of scientific knowledge that remain within the paradigm. 
The empirical challenge to the Neoclassical paradigm was the crisis of 1929, when 
market forces fail spectacularly in assuring a fast return to full employment, after the 
Wall Street crash. Gjerstad and Smith (2014) highlight the pattern of real estate 
appreciation, increasing house-hold debt and booming consumption in the period leading 
to the financial crisis of 1929, followed by a “Great Depression” in which falling house 
prices fed back into wealth contraction, and led to a contraction of consumption and 
investment. The “Great Recession” that started in 2008 shows a strikingly similar 
pattern. 
But the crisis of 1929 was just the endpoint of a difficult decade, marked by the 
return of the pound Sterling to the gold standard, by decreasing wages and increasing 
debt, and in general by economic instability. This boom and bust cycle was difficult to 
reconcile with a theory postulating perfectly rational, forward-looking agents. And 
equally hard to explain was the persistence of the recession and of mass unemployment, 
hardly compatible with the optimal allocation of resources and the impossibility of 
involuntary unemployment. 
Nevertheless, Kuhn argues, empirical difficulties for a paradigm are not enough to 
trigger a scientific revolution. An alternative paradigm, capable of overcoming those 
difficulties, needs to be ready to take over from the previous one. 
The alternative to the efficient markets paradigm came from a group of economists 
working under the guidance of John Maynard Keynes. The turbulent decade that 
culminated with the crisis, well exemplified by the British strikes of 1926, led Keynes 
(1925; 1926) to question the Neoclassical faith in laissez-faire and self-regulating 
markets. With the publication of the General Theory in 1936, the British economist 
centred the theoretical challenge to the Neoclassical paradigm on the rejection of the 
Neoclassical dichotomy between nominal and real variables, which in turn entailed 
refuting Say’s Law and the capacity of markets to attain full employment equilibrium. 
2.1.2 Uncertainty, money, and aggregate demand: The Keynesian revolution 
The publication of Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 
1936, is usually identified with the birth of macroeconomics. Faced with the disruption 
caused by the Great Depression, Keynes challenges the Neoclassical paradigm regarding 
the capacity of markets to spontaneously converge to optimal, full employment 
equilibria. 
To challenge the Neoclassical theory, Keynes does not focus on the postulate of 
rationality, which he accepts. Rather, he argues that Say’s Law is flawed, and that 
markets may be unable to generate, through interest rate variations, enough investment to 
match the level of savings corresponding to full employment output. In other words, 
aggregate demand may fail to absorb the full employment level of production. In that 
case, Keynes argues, the equilibrium is reached by a drop of economic activity, and of 
savings, that adapt to “autonomous” investment. The economy settles on an equilibrium 
characterized by involuntary unemployment. Keynes’ message is therefore that, if the 
policy-maker’s objective is full employment, monetary and (especially) fiscal policy 
need to be used actively. 
But why is the interest rate unable to reach the level such that investment absorbs all 
savings corresponding to full employment production? The reason is, according to 
Keynes, that we live in a world in which both firms and households face radical 
uncertainty. The necessity to make choices in a context of radical uncertainty, in turn, 
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implies that money acquires a role that it did not have in the Neoclassical framework. 
Building on the work of authors such as Wicksell (1898), as well as on his own (1930), 
Keynes argues that money has an intrinsic utility as a store of value because, while it is 
true that it does not yield a return, it is liquid and safe, if compared to bonds4. In other 
words, money holdings do not only depend on the transactions that agents wish to 
perform, but also on a portfolio choice between money and other assets. Households who 
saved part of their income need to choose between the safety of holding money, at the 
cost of earning no interest, and the interest earned on other assets (for example bonds), at 
the cost of risking a loss on their capital. The interest rate becomes then the opportunity 
cost for holding cash balances. The more consumers feel uncertain, the higher will be the 
interest rate that they ask for in order to give up the safety of cash. 
In a Neoclassical world hoarding would be irrational, because the economy manages 
to eventually converge to full employment, and there would be no space for uncertainty 
and for valuing the safety of cash. Keynes argues that this happens only in very specific 
situations, in which agents do not face radical uncertainty. In that case, full employment 
savings are channeled to firms via the financial sector, and transformed into investment. 
But in general, radical uncertainty may induce people to prefer money, a safe and liquid 
asset, to bonds (“liquidity preference”), hence Keynes’ claim that his own is the real 
“General Theory” of which the Neoclassical model is a particular case. 
The interest rate plays a marginal role in affecting the choice of how much to save 
(or invest), but a major role in determining the choice of how much of their savings 
consumers want to keep as cash. The interest rate, in other words, is not the price that 
brings to equilibrium savings and investment; rather, it is the price that equilibrates 
demand for money with its supply (jointly determined by the central bank and by the 
banking sector). 
The rest follows easily: savings hoarded by agents in the form of money balances 
cannot be transformed in demand for investment goods by firms, thus breaking Say’s 
Law: not all income generates a corresponding demand. Liquidity leaks out of the flow 
of income, and effective demand is lower than notional or full employment demand. 
Investment is “autonomous”, and the adjustment needs to take place through a reduction 
of savings. Income will then fall, bringing savings down and re-establishing the equality 
ex post between savings and investment. This is the essence of the difference between 
Keynes and the Neoclassical theory. In the latter, whenever the savings and investment 
decisions are not consistent with each other, price changes (in particular the interest rate) 
will bring about the equality of the two quantities at full employment level. In Keynes on 
the other hand, the interest rate plays a very limited role in the loanable funds market5, 
and as a consequence the ex ante disequilibrium will be reabsorbed by a change of 
quantities, i.e. by a fall of production to the level determined by effective demand. 
Faced with unsold goods, firms will reduce production and employment: workers 
may wish to work at current wages, but aggregate demand being insufficient to absorb 
production, firms will not be interested in hiring. Contrary to the Neoclassical case, 
unemployment may be involuntary. 
                                                         
4 A more detailed account of Keynes’ theory of money, and its intellectual background, can be found in 
Gaffard and Saraceno (2016). 
5 The interest rate may not be the only channel at work, though. We will see in Section 2.2 that, at least in 
theory, a wealth (or Pigou) effect may be at work and bring about full employment even in a Keynesian case. 
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But in fact, the Neoclassical theory also admits involuntary unemployment, as a 
result of market imperfections, or – sometimes related – of wage rigidities. If contracts 
between workers and entrepreneurs are stipulated at the “wrong” real wage, then 
involuntary unemployment will appear at equilibrium, and persist as long as the wage is 
not free to adjust to its full employment level. But then, structural reforms introducing 
flexibility in the labour market would solve the problem. Keynes forcefully rejects this 
view: in Chapter XIX of the General Theory, he writes that whenever uncertainty and 
liquidity preference yield insufficient demand, not only would wage flexibility be 
incapable of restoring full employment, but would be harmful: 
If money-wages were to fall without limit whenever there was a tendency for less than 
full employment, [...] there would be no resting place below full employment until either the 
rate of interest was incapable of falling further, or wages were zero. In fact, we must have 
some factor, the value of which in terms of money is, if not fixed, at least sticky, to give us 
any stability of values in a monetary system (Keynes, 1936: p. 303). 
In other words, wage flexibility could trigger a deflationary spiral of wage 
reductions, lower income and increased uncertainty, further reduction of expenditure, 
unemployment, and more wage reductions. Keynes therefore reverses the common 
wisdom on wage rigidity that, in his theory, rather than a source of disequilibrium, 
becomes a necessary institutional feature to avoid the implosion of the system. 
It is interesting to notice, nevertheless that the labour market remains at the margins 
of Keynes’ analysis. Most of the action happens in the market for savings and 
investment, that determines the level of activity, and – via technology and the production 
function – employment. Somewhat paradoxically therefore, unemployment, which 
justified the Keynesian challenge to the Neoclassical paradigm, is a “derivative 
phenomenon” with its roots in the goods market (sub-optimal) equilibrium. But this 
paradox is also the main theoretical innovation of the British economist. Savings and 
investment depend on monetary and real factors, on prices and income, on expectations 
by households, and on firms’ animal spirits. Keynes therefore develops a real “General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”, in which labour market interventions 
(increased flexibility, wage decreases) may not lead to an increase in employment. 
A role for activist macroeconomic policies  
If markets do not necessarily converge to the optimal equilibrium, then 
macroeconomic policy has a role to play to restore full employment. Keynes argues at 
length that temporary government intervention in the form of expansionary monetary or 
fiscal policy, may fill the gap between effective demand and supply, thus sustaining 
economic activity. 
It is important to notice, furthermore, that these policies have a double objective. 
The first is to substitute for missing private demand. The second is, by sustaining 
economic activity, to trigger a change of expectations and set the condition for resumed 
private expenditure. Missing public aggregate demand support, the economy remains 
trapped into a deflationary trap of falling prices, persistent unemployment, gloomy 
expectations and falling private expenditure. 
Monetary and fiscal policy are not alike, though. Keynes ranks fiscal policy higher 
than monetary policy6. While both instruments are in principle capable of lifting the 
economy out of the slump, fiscal policy directly impacts on economic activity through 
                                                         
6 For a detailed discussion and somewhat different view, see Leijonhufvud (1968). 
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government purchases, while monetary policy only operates by changing agents’ 
behaviours, and as such can run into some difficulties. 
The limits of monetary policy  
As money demand is central to Keynes’ analysis, the British economist considers 
whether monetary policy could help the economy converge to full employment. A 
monetary expansion has the same impact of a drop in wages: by lowering the interest 
rate, it increases profitability for a given state of expectations and hence, in principle, it 
could trigger an increase in investment and fill the gap with savings. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons why Keynes believes that there exist 
“limitations on the ability of the monetary authority” to effectively steer the economy 
towards full employment. 
The first source of trouble that Keynes considers is the most extreme – the so-called 
liquidity trap:  
There is the possibility, [...] that, after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain level, 
liquidity-preference may become virtually absolute in the sense that almost everyone prefers 
cash to holding a debt which yields so low a rate of interest. In this event the monetary 
authority would have lost effective control over the rate of interest. (Keynes, 1936: p. 207)  
The interest elasticity of money demand is near-infinite: no matter how much liquidity 
the central bank injects into the economy it is entirely hoarded by agents and hence it 
leaks out of the system in its entirety. Monetary expansion is not effective in lowering 
interest rates. 
By looking at the Great Depression Keynes argued that this usually happens at very 
low (but not necessarily nil) levels of the interest rate, because in this case agents would 
expect interest rates to rise in the future and thus would be willing to hold any extra 
amount of money and postpone the purchase of bonds to the moment when interest rates 
will be up again. More recently the liquidity trap has been defined as a situation in which 
the interest rate that equates savings and investment is negative, and therefore cannot be 
attained by the central bank (the so-called Zero Lower Bound, see e.g. Krugman (2000)). 
This last definition leaves some room for monetary policy effectiveness: if the central 
bank manages to trigger the expectations of positive inflation, the real interest rate will 
become negative and lead to the full employment equilibrium. 
The liquidity trap has long been considered a subject for economic historians. It is 
true that over the 1990s, as Japan progressively reduced its interest rates, trying to kick-
start the economy after the deep recession caused by a housing bubble burst, monetary 
policy progressively became ineffective. Japan had nevertheless been considered a very 
peculiar case. The financial crisis of 2008 promptly brought back the liquidity trap from 
the history books to the front of the scene, right in the core of the world economy. At the 
outbreak of the crisis in 2008, central banks reacted by flooding the markets with 
liquidity. But this liquidity was hoarded by banks, households, and firms, that were 
attempting to deleverage. As a consequence, liquidity injections, while they avoided the 
collapse of the financial system, did not fuel lending, investment and consumer spending. 
This is why in a second phase most governments intervened with fiscal stimulus 
packages. 
While the liquidity trap is an extreme situation, a second source of problems – 
including in normal times – relates to the capacity of monetary policy decisions to impact 
private expenditure decisions: the transmission channel. Keynes argues in Chapter XV of 
the General Theory (pp. 203-4) that in order to have an impact on long term rates, 
monetary policy needs to be predictable and stable. The difficulty for monetary policy 
lies therefore in the contradiction between the need to accommodate intrinsically “fickle 
and highly unstable” expectations by firms, and provide a stable policy environment to 
financial markets. 
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The importance of “managing expectations” can better be appreciated when the 
transmission mechanism is broken. The recent attempts of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) to revive inflation in the Eurozone have so far been unsuccessful precisely 
because they did not succeed in re-anchoring expectations (for more details, see 
Saraceno, 2016a). 
Furthermore, even when successful in influencing market interest rates, monetary 
policy faces an additional difficulty in that it is unclear how sensitive private expenditure 
is to the interest rate. As we saw above, prices play a lesser role in the Keynesian 
analysis than they play in the Neoclassical framework. Savings and consumption 
decisions mostly depend on income, and even for investment the interest rate plays a 
rather minor role (as the cost of capital) if compared to expectations about future demand 
and revenues. Hence, changes in the interest rate may fail to boost private expenditure. 
Fiscal policy and the multiplier 
While the effect of monetary policy on economic activity goes through its capacity 
to influence expectations and private expenditure, and as such may be ineffective 
(especially at times of crises), government expenditure is a component of aggregate 
demand, and hence it directly influences output. Government expenditure can fill the gap 
between private demand and full employment supply, thus reabsorbing the excess of 
savings over investment. 
But how much will output increase following a government expenditure boost? In 
Chapter X of the General Theory, Keynes lays down his theory of the multiplier: the 
increase of production will lead to an increase of income (wages and profits) available 
for consumers to spend, and hence to a further increase of aggregate demand. 
Thus, Keynes concludes that fiscal policy should be the preferred instrument for 
macroeconomic stabilization, a view shared by economists influenced by his work in the 
following decades (Leijonhufvud, 1968). This is a rather interesting conclusion in view 
of the doctrine that emerged starting from the 1980s, when the struggle between the 
Neoclassical and Keynesian paradigms eventually converged towards a consensus giving 
more weight to monetary policy than to fiscal policy (see Section 2.3 below). 
Keynes’ very strong policy conclusion goes against the common wisdom of the 
time, the so-called “Treasury View”, which argues that any increase in government 
expenditure will be ineffective because it crowds out private expenditure. To increase 
expenditure the government will have to borrow, and to compete with firms and 
households for funds. This will drive up interest rates, and reduce private expenditure. 
Keynes argues, on the contrary, that fiscal policy is necessary precisely when there 
is no private demand for funds (i.e. savings are sitting idle), and therefore public 
expenditure will have no effect on interest rates, as there is no competition with private 
agents for scarce funds. We will see in Section 5.1 that the size of the multiplier has been 
a source of ever-going controversy since the publication of the General Theory. 
It is interesting to notice that Keynes is not necessarily in favour of big government. 
The General Theory is mostly dedicated to understanding the reasons for demand-led 
business cycles, and he advocates stabilization policies to reduce the size and persistence 
of economic slumps. What Keynes seems to have in mind, therefore, is an active 
government, capable of intervening in the economy when private demand falters, and to 
withdraw when, thanks to its own intervention, the economy recovers. There are in the 
General Theory a number of instances in which he advocates a different role for the 
government (most notably in Chapter XXIV, when he discusses “social investment”). 
But even in these cases he seems more focused on compensating for possible market 
failures, than on advocating an important role of the government per se. 
 11 
 
2.1.3 From the New Deal to stagflation: The rise and fall of Keynesian 
economics 
Keynes wrote the General Theory in the midst of the Great Depression, when most 
governments were still following the Treasury View. With a few exceptions, the early 
response to the crisis was in fact consistent with the prescriptions of the Neoclassical 
theory. In the United States, monetary policy was initially strongly contractionary (see 
the classic account by Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). Like in most countries, the attempt 
to maintain the international gold standard did not allow the utilisation of monetary 
policy to stop the fall in credit and in the money supply (Fishback, 2010). In the 
meantime, both under the Hoover administration and even more with the Roosevelt 
administration, public expenditure increased substantially, but government revenues also 
grew through a number of taxes increases, so that the deficit increased very little and 
fiscal stimulus was rather limited. In fact, the recovery that started in 1933 is attributed to 
a monetary expansion (Romer, 1992): large gold inflows in the mid-1930s yielded an 
increase of the money supply, lower interest rates, and an increase of investment 
spending and purchases of durable goods. The policy reversal of 1937 was due to the 
attempt to eliminate the even modest deficits that had appeared in the early 1930s, and to 
the fear of inflation triggered by the modest recovery. That episode, that reminds of the 
ill-timed switch to austerity in 2011 (Krugman, 2010), yielded a second recession. 
In fact, only a few countries embarked in Keynesian policies at the outset of the 
Great Depression. In all of these countries expansionary policies took the form of 
increased military spending (Almunia et al., 2010). Fiscal policy in the US only turned 
expansionary after the country started preparing for war in the late 1930s. Interestingly 
enough, the Keynesian episode was rather short-lived, as the large fiscal and monetary 
stimulus boosted the economy that quickly reached its full employment level. The war 
preparation effort led to higher inflation starting from the end of 1941 (Gordon and 
Krenn, 2010). 
By the end of the war, the pendulum had swung towards heavy intervention of the 
government in the economy. Better equipped to explain a crisis that was essentially due 
to demand factors, the Keynesian paradigm displaced the Neoclassical theory to become 
the new reference in academia and in policy circles alike. 
The General Theory inspired the proactive policies that would find their justification 
in the emergence of “hydraulic Keynesianism” (Coddington, 1976). The IS-LM7 model 
(see Section 2.2.1 below) represented the economy at stable equilibrium conditions that, 
among other things, would depend from policy-makers’ actions: a mechanical system in 
which each action of the government would correspond to a reaction by the economy. 
Monetary policy would have an impact on the equilibrium in the money market, while 
fiscal policy would be able to affect the equilibrium in the goods markets. An appropriate 
combination of fiscal and monetary policy would therefore allow to reach any level of 
income (and of the interest rate) desired by the government. 
                                                         
7 This model was developed by Hicks (1937) and Modigliani (1944) to illustrate the relationship between the 
interest rate and output based on the investment–saving (IS) and liquidity preference–money supply (LM) 
curves. 
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Oil shocks and stagflation: The crisis of the Keynesian paradigm 
For three decades governments succeeded in managing the economy and in “fine 
tuning” the business cycle in order to smooth economic fluctuations. This contributed to 
a long period of tumultuous growth, whose roots nevertheless are only partially to do 
with activist macroeconomic policies; rather, they can be traced to technical progress, a 
boom in trade, economic convergence, and the fast accumulation of capital to replenish 
the stock destroyed by the war. The long period of steady growth and the Keynesian 
paradigm dominance contributed nevertheless to the myth of the almighty policy-maker 
that could steer the economy at its will. 
As the great recession had been the empirical challenge for the Neoclassical theory, 
the Keynesian theory ran into serious difficulties when inflation and subdued economic 
activity appeared at the beginning of the 1970s due to the two oil shocks, and the period 
of unstable prices that followed, as well as the increase of the so-called natural 
unemployment rate due mostly to demographic factors (Shimer, 1998); the slowdown in 
productivity growth. All these shocks originated on the supply side of the economy, and 
the growth slowdown that they triggered had nothing to do with insufficient aggregate 
demand. 
A wrong diagnosis about the slowdown in growth, and the erroneous belief that the 
economy was running below potential, led policy-makers to react to supply shocks by 
increasing aggregate demand through expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. This 
widened the gap between aggregate demand and aggregate supply and further fuelled 
inflation, without lifting the economy out of the slump. Stagflation became the new word 
of the 1970s. 
The crisis of Keynesian theory triggered a new paradigm shift. The empirical 
challenge would have not been enough to displace the Keynesian paradigm, had it not 
also encountered theoretical difficulties. Keynesian theory came to be criticized – 
somewhat unfairly given that Keynes had never wanted to go beyond a theory of 
depression – because it neglected the supply side of the economy, and most notably the 
link between macroeconomic policy and inflation. Furthermore, the vulgarization of the 
General Theory carried out by hydraulic Keynesianism paved the way to a reabsorption 
of Keynes into Neoclassical theory. 
2.2 Expectations and the Neoclassical counterrevolution 
The comeback of Neoclassical theory, in a new and revised form, exploited the 
weaknesses of the Keynesian construct. Three streams of research emerged, all 
challenging the Keynesian paradigm and its reliance on macroeconomic policy to ensure 
convergence to full employment. The first, monetarism, challenged Keynes on the 
ground of money neutrality. The second, rational expectations, introduced a treatment of 
agents’ expectations consistent with the principle of rationality and optimization. The 
third, Real Business Cycles (RBC), invoked technology and supply shock sides as the 
sole determinants of output fluctuations. Their target, rather than the original Keynesian 
theory, was its IS-LM “vulgarization”. 
2.2.1 The Neoclassical synthesis 
The post-war period saw the triumph of the so-called Neoclassical synthesis, built 
around Hicks’ (1937) and Modigliani’s (1944) IS-LM model. This representation of the 
Keynesian system, while it proved to be a formidable pedagogical tool, also contributed 
to the reabsorption of Keynes within the Neoclassical theory. 
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The IS-LM model is a simple characterization of the demand side of the economy in 
the short run, with fixed prices and wages8. The model was seen as a faithful 
representation of Keynes because the income level is determined by aggregate demand, 
which in turn depends, among other things, on the liquidity preference of agents. 
Aggregate demand is determined by the simultaneous equilibrium in two markets: 
the goods market and the money market, where the preference for liquidity captures 
Keynes’ idea that money may be demanded because it is a safe store of value. Savings 
can be used to buy bonds, or kept as cash, depending on the yields offered by the former. 
The demand for money is therefore the result of a portfolio choice between yields and 
safety. 
The main result of the model is that the simultaneous equilibrium of money and 
goods market may yield a level of activity which is inferior to full employment. In the 
labour market, demand for labour is too low, and wages too high. The IS-LM is therefore 
faithful to the “Keynesian” message that unemployment is determined in the goods 
market by insufficient demand, and therefore involuntary. But it departs in a fundamental 
way from the British economist, because it posits wage rigidities as the ultimate source 
of this unemployment. 
In the IS-LM model fiscal and monetary policy can be used, alone or jointly, to 
increase aggregate demand and reabsorb unemployment. Which of the two tools is more 
effective would then depend on the hypotheses about the behaviour of agents. 
Economists leaning towards Keynesian ideas would tend to believe that investment is 
relatively insensitive to interest rate variations, while the contrary holds for money 
demand (the limiting case being the liquidity trap, see p. 9). In this case, fiscal policy 
should be preferred because it is more effective. On the other hand, if investment 
responds to the interest rate more than to expected demand, and if money demand mostly 
depends on income – as a Neoclassical economists would believe – then fiscal policy 
would be largely ineffective as it would lead to increases of the interest rate and the 
crowding-out of investment. Thus, the choice of the preferred policy instrument depends 
on an empirical assessment about the value of elasticities. 
The IS-LM model was instrumental to the “normalization” of Keynes: on one hand 
the role of radical uncertainty, that in the General Theory was the source of leakage and 
aggregate demand deficiencies, is strongly reduced; money demand is the simple result 
of a portfolio choice. On the other hand, assuming the existence of stable equilibrium 
relationships that determine aggregate demand, it opens the way for the possibility of 
market adjustments that bring the economy to full employment without government 
intervention. 
Suppose that the economy settles on an equilibrium characterized by insufficient 
demand and involuntary unemployment. In the medium run, this will put downwards 
pressure on wages and prices, yielding an increase of the real quantity of money (the 
“Real Balance effect”) - the same effect that a monetary expansion would have. But then, 
it is impossible for the economy to remain stuck at the low employment equilibrium. 
Once real balances increase, the demand for bonds will increase, driving the interest rate 
down, and eventually resulting in an increase of investment. This is the so-called Keynes 
effect. If on the other hand the economy is in a liquidity trap, in which the transmission 
channel from the quantity of money to investment is broken, the adjustment can still 
                                                         
8 While Hicks was ambiguous on this, Modigliani made clear from the very beginning that the hypothesis of 
fixed prices was central for the model. 
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happen through the Pigou effect (Patinkin, 1948): real balances are part of households’ 
wealth, so their increase will push up consumption expenditure and aggregate demand. 
Thus, either via investment (Keynes Effect) or consumption (Pigou Effect), a wage 
and price decrease will trigger a market adjustment, and lead the economy back to full 
employment. Keynesian underemployment can be an equilibrium only in the short run, 
and if prices are sticky. The General Theory is not general after all, but rather a particular 
case of the neo- classical theory: 
The Keynesian message appeared as specific to a situation, as dependent on restrictions 
imposed upon a more general proposition: price rigidity, money illusion, liquidity trap, the 
non intersection of function on a positive plan etc. [...] The Keynesian system is then 
perceived as a malfunctioning Walrasian system and the study of some pathological states of 
a Walrasian model is called Keynesian economics. The way is thus open for the re-
integration of the Keynesian message into a more general system of interpretation: the 
neoclassical synthesis. (Fitoussi, 1983: p. 4) 
2.2.2 Monetarism 
Monetarism, associated with the work of Milton Friedman and his co-authors 
(Friedman, 1957; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963), starts somewhat paradoxically by 
challenging Keynes’ argument about the ineffectiveness of monetary policy. Friedman 
argues that at least in the long run, it is hard to argue against the quantity equation linking 
prices and the quantity of money, and therefore against money neutrality. 
Relying on the standard representation of Keynesian theory as a short run fix-price 
case of the Neoclassical model (Section 2.2.1), Friedman links Keynesian unemployment 
to the rigidity of wages that, he argues, is hard to defend in the long run. Macroeconomic 
policies, therefore cannot be relied upon beyond the short run in which, at any rate, their 
impact on the economy is rather unpredictable. In particular, monetarists argue, a proper 
consideration of expectations – that in Keynes while crucial to justify liquidity preference, 
were left exogenous – leads to unintended consequences of stabilization policies. 
The most famous application of the monetarist critique is the debate on the Phillips 
curve that was born as a statistical inverse relationship between wages and unemployment 
(Phillips, 1958), but had gradually come to be interpreted by policy-makers as a menu 
available for the almighty policy-maker: any level of employment could be chosen, as long 
as the policy-maker was ready to pay the price in terms of inflation. 
Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) famously show that, once expectations are made 
endogenous in the IS-LM version of the Keynesian model (through an adaptive learning 
scheme), the economy tends to converge to the Neoclassical long-term equilibrium. 
Governments could of course surprise markets and lead the economy away from its 
“natural” equilibrium. But this has to be done at the price of ever-increasing inflation and 
is eventually bound to be undone by markets once learning has taken place. 
The monetarist conclusion hence runs against the Keynesian common wisdom: the 
impact of fiscal and monetary policy would be zero in the long run (the Phillips curve is 
vertical in the long run), and uncertain in the short run. Fiscal policy, in particular, could 
not be used to “‘fine tune” the economy as argued by the hydraulic Keynesians (Friedman 
and Heller, 1969). The inverse statistical relationship highlighted by Phillips, conclude the 
monetarists, was stable only because it corresponded to a period of moderate inflation and 
prices. 
The monetarist critique is important for our analysis because its policy conclusion - 
carried into the “new consensus” to be analysed later in Section 2.3- is that governments 
should restrain from using discretionary policies, that are ineffective in the long run, and 
bound to perturb agents. Sticking to rules is the best that governments can do to allow the 
smooth functioning of markets. The actual rule proposed by Friedman, a constant growth 
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rate of money aggregates, came to be discredited (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003). But the shift 
of focus from discretionary policies to predictable rules was an enormous change, and still 
has an influence on the current debate on macroeconomic policy, especially in Europe. 
2.2.3 Rational expectations and the “New Classical” macroeconomics 
Rational expectations, introduced by John F. Muth in 1961, made it into 
macroeconomic models mostly through the work of Robert Lucas in the early 1970s (1972; 
1973). This strand of literature, that dubbed itself “new classical” to mark its opposition to 
Keynes, goes back to the fundamentals of the Neoclassical model, namely perfectly 
competitive markets populated by rational maximizing agents. 
Like the monetarists, new classical economists reject Keynes’ main innovation, 
radical uncertainty, in favour of a notion of uncertainty based on risk. And like the 
monetarists, they argue that expectations change in response to government action; as such, 
considering them as given as Keynes did, is unwarranted. 
Lucas and co-authors argue that there is no reason for rational and perfectly 
informed agents to overlook the information they possess when forming expectations. 
Backward expectations formation neglects the knowledge of the model agents possess, and 
as such cannot be labeled as “rational”. Taken together with Friedman’s natural rate 
hypothesis, rational expectations lead to the rejection of activist macroeconomic policy in 
the short as well as in the long run. Loosely speaking, rational expectations shorten the 
transition towards the natural equilibrium described by the monetarists, up to the point 
where it becomes an instantaneous jump. If agents know the model of the economy, they 
also know that following an expansionary policy, the economy will eventually converge to 
an equilibrium characterized by the same level of activity, and higher inflation. Thus, they 
will adapt their behaviour to this knowledge and the economy will directly jump to the new 
equilibrium without undergoing the transition described by Friedman and Phelps. 
The monetarist claim that policy is irrelevant is therefore strengthened by rational 
expectations (Sargent and Wallace, 1975). Governments may have an impact on the 
economy only if their information set is different (and richer) than the information set of 
private agents. But a fully transparent government will need not to intervene, as the 
economy will be able to self-correct following a shock and converge quickly towards the 
new equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, like the monetarists before, the rational expectations counter-
revolution is incomplete. While the “natural” output of the economy is determined by the 
supply side of the economy in the Neoclassical tradition, for Lucas and his co-authors the 
cycle remains fundamentally driven by demand factors. These range from price rigidities 
that prevent agents from optimally reacting to shocks, to (vain) fiscal and monetary 
attempts to influence the path followed by the economy. 
New classical macroeconomics pose a serious challenge to Keynesian analysis, but 
do not push the consequences of rational expectations to their limit. Fluctuations in new 
classical models still stem from the economy’s slowness in responding to a shock, be it real 
or monetary. Agents’ incomplete information (as in Lucas, 1972; 1973), or rigidities of 
some sort, determine the gap between the economy’s level of activity (demand) and the 
“natural” optimal level of production. While rational agents quickly learn and return to 
equilibrium without government intervention, the observed fluctuations remain demand-
driven and sub-optimal. To complete the dismissal of the Keynesian revolution, a last step 
is needed: a theory that removes aggregate demand from the determinants of business cycle 
fluctuations. 
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2.2.4 Real Business Cycles (RBC) 
The Real Business Cycle (RBC) literature, initiated by the seminal articles by 
Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983), departs from the view, shared 
by Keynesian and new classical economists alike, that business cycles indicate a failure 
of the market to reach an optimal equilibrium, and argues on the contrary that output 
fluctuations stem from the optimal response of markets to random technological shocks. 
The emphasis on supply side factors to explain business cycles is not new9. Its 
revival in the 1980s was not fortuitous, as the preceding decade had seen wild income 
fluctuations associated with the oil shocks and the fluctuations in aggregate supply they 
had triggered. Shocks which had been tackled with demand side policies had led to 
stagflation (see p. 12). 
If agents are perfectly rational, RBC theorists argued, it is hard to justify significant 
deviations from the optimal path of the economy. Therefore, as these fluctuations are 
observed in the data, they must originate in the optimizing behaviour of agents. Like new 
classical macroeconomists, RBC authors go back to the rational consumer arbitraging 
between labour and leisure, as well as between present and future consumption (savings), 
based on real wages and the interest rate. Furthermore, rationality also suggests that 
monetary factors play little or no role in explaining real outcomes (as money carries no 
direct utility, see p. 5), so that the old Neoclassical neutrality and dichotomy result is 
revived, even in the short run. 
RBC models all share two elements: first, the sources of fluctuations are 
technological changes that, via the interest rate, trigger a response of optimal 
consumption and of labour supply, thus yielding equilibrium fluctuations in output. More 
specifically, an increase in capital productivity yields higher interest rates (rejecting 
Keynes’ theory of money, the new classical theory goes back to the interest rate as the 
return on capital) and more savings by rational consumers, who will also supply more 
labour because of higher productivity. Thus, RBC models go back to a number of pre-
Keynesian results: (a) fluctuations in employment are voluntary and optimal; (b) money 
is neutral; (c) price flexibility guarantees instantaneous adjustment of markets that are 
continuously in equilibrium. 
The second feature of RBC models is that they are built around a few equations 
describing household and firm behaviour, together with their equilibrium interaction. 
They can therefore easily be tested with data, and used to fit macroeconomic time series. 
“Calibration” of the model with parameters describing agents’ behaviour, allows to use 
them to predict the behaviour of macroeconomic variables such as GDP, employment, 
and so on. 
To summarize, the rebuttal of Keynes happened in two steps. First, the introduction 
of rational expectations eliminated the need for government intervention in a framework 
that still recognized the importance of demand in explaining business cycles. Second, 
RBC models revived the pre-Keynesian view that supply is all that counts in explaining 
both the short and long run behaviour of the economy. 
With the RBC stream of literature, the counterrevolution has come full circle, and 
by the mid-1980s, the intellectual defeat of the Keynesian paradigm seems definitive: 
                                                         
9 Goodhart (1992) details how Dennis Robertson in 1915 described business cycles originating in the 
behaviour of farmers adapting their labour supply and consumption patterns to the fluctuations of 
productivity. 
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The task now facing contemporary students of the business cycle is to sort through the 
wreckage, determining which features of that remarkable intellectual event called the 
Keynesian Revolution can be salvaged and put to good use and which others must be 
discarded. (Lucas and Sargent, 1979: p. 1) 
The dismissal of Keynesian ideas in academia was accompanied by a conservative 
revolution. On one side, monetary policy was geared towards fighting inflation, 
consistently with the monetarist neutrality creed. On the other, privatization, 
deregulation, and supply-side policies reflected the renewed dominance of the classical 
paradigms in macroeconomics, aimed at minimizing the role of the government in the 
economy. 
2.3 The New Consensus 
I believe that there has been a considerable convergence of opinion among 
macroeconomists over the past 10 or 15 years. While the problems of the field have not all 
been resolved, there are no longer such fundamental disagreements among leading 
macroeconomists about what kind of questions one might reasonably seek to answer, or what 
kinds of theoretical analyses or empirical studies should be admitted as contributions to 
knowledge.[...] Progress in macroeconomic analysis has made it possible to see that the 
alternatives between which earlier generations felt it necessary to choose were not so 
thoroughly incompatible when understood more deeply. (Woodford, 2009: p. 268) 
Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory dominated the intellectual (and political) 
landscape for more than a decade. RBC models nevertheless ran into methodological and 
empirical problems, such as the fact that long business cycles seemed difficult to explain 
if agents were rational and fully informed. Furthermore, the ambition of RBC models to 
explain co-movements in macroeconomic variables turned into a major problem when 
the approach was shown not to fit some basic regularities, such as the fact that interest 
rates – or the propensity to save – move in the opposite direction during slumps than 
predicted by the theory (Phelps, 1990: pp. 86-90). This incapacity to fit data hid a more 
fundamental problem, though. As Larry Summers (1986) puts it: 
In [the RBC] model, the central driving force behind cyclical fluctuations is technological 
shocks. The propagation mechanism is intertemporal substitution in employment. [...] there 
is no independent evidence from any source for either of these phenomena. (p. 25) 
Together with the difficulties of RBC models, emerged the attempt to recover 
Keynesian features in microfounded models, in which market imperfections could cause 
departures from the Walrasian equilibrium. These imperfections could be of a different 
nature. For example real wage rigidities due to asymmetric information (the so-called 
efficiency wage models), or the market power of unions (insider-outsider models) would 
yield equilibria in the labour market with involuntary unemployment. At the same time, 
nominal price and wage rigidities, that could be due to the costs involved in the price 
setting mechanism (the small menu costs), or to articulation in time of the wage contracts 
mechanism (staggered prices models), would yield fluctuations of income around the 
natural equilibrium10. Neither real nor nominal rigidities can, by themselves, explain 
involuntary unemployment and business cycle fluctuations. But, New Keynesian 
economists argue that their joint influence can help explain the patterns of GDP growth 
and unemployment observed in the data (Ball and Romer, 1990). 
                                                         
10 To have an idea of the wealth of contributions to this literature the reader can refer to the papers collected 
in Mankiw and Romer (1991). 
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The economics profession therefore evolved towards what might be called a “New 
Consensus” that, relying on both nominal and real rigidities, blends a short run with 
Keynesian features, and a long run where supply-side factors are dominant (Blanchard, 
1997). This consensus has a representation in standard macroeconomics undergraduate 
textbooks that are usually split in two independent parts. 
The typical tools of the New Consensus, widely used by academics and by 
international institutions, are the so-called dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models that embed in a RBC structure a number of nominal rigidities and 
imperfections. These models are built around three main blocks: (i) maximising 
households, who choose consumption/savings and hours worked, subject to a budget 
constraint; (ii) maximising firms, who decide how much labour and capital to demand; 
and (iii) the central bank, which controls the interest rate, and hence affects the 
consumption and investment choice. The models can then include other institutions such 
as fiscal policy and banks, depending on the type of problem they want to study. But the 
three main blocks capture the “monetary policy dominance” of the New Consensus. 
DSGE models most commonly feature price and wage rigidities, accompanied by 
the existence of a number of consumers who are unwilling or incapable of maximizing 
utility over time, the so-called Non-Ricardian consumers. Rigidities in turn allow for the 
appearance of significant demand shortages, and hence of Keynesian features, that are 
nevertheless limited to the short run. Furthermore, central banks have an impact on the 
economy, because sticky prices fail to instantaneously adapt to nominal interest changes 
and the real interest rate therefore can be impacted by monetary policy choices at least in 
the short run. 
Going through the many facets of the New Consensus is well beyond the scope of 
this paper11. What is relevant for our purposes is that the New Consensus has developed a 
number of results that are independent of the features of individual models: 
1. The baseline model is the RBC model in which fluctuations are determined by the 
optimal reaction of agents to supply side shocks, most notably technological shocks, 
and are hence to be considered “natural”. Market imperfections and rigidities may 
cause this natural equilibrium to be different from the Pareto first-best outcome. 
Rigidities and imperfections may have different sources: efficiency wages, 
staggered price and wage setting, incomplete markets, search and bargaining costs, 
information asymmetries, imperfect competition, liquidity constraints or 
coordination problems. These are some of the many imperfections that can be 
embedded in otherwise standard rational expectations models to yield departures of 
the natural rate from the Pareto optimum. 
2. To increase the natural growth rate of the economy, and to make the natural 
equilibrium converge to the first-best, policy needs to eliminate the rigidities 
through the very same structural reforms that were called for by New Classical 
macroeconomists. 
3. Market imperfections, mainly nominal rigidities, also cause short run departures 
from the natural growth rate, to yield demand-driven business cycle fluctuations in 
the short run. More precisely, when the economy is hit by a shock, imperfections 
prevent agents from reacting to the shock optimally, and remaining on the natural 
output path. 
                                                         
11 A good starting point for the interested reader are two papers by Olivier Blanchard (2000; 2009); see also 
Woodford (2009). 
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4. The short run deviations from natural output tend to be reabsorbed in the medium 
run by markets through (mostly price and wage) flexibility. 
5. Discretionary macroeconomic policies are ineffective in stabilizing economic 
activity. Rules are to be preferred because they make policy predictable and hence 
easier to embed in agents’ expectations. 
6. Monetary policy should be preferred to fiscal policy mostly for two reasons. First, it 
is less subject to lags in decision-making and in implementation; second, it can be 
delegated to independent and technocratic bodies that are not subject to political 
biases and capture by vested interests. Furthermore, monetary policy aimed at 
stabilizing inflation will in most cases also keep output at its optimal level (what 
Blanchard and Galí (2007) call “divine coincidence”), thus making any further 
policy intervention unnecessary. 
7. Short run fluctuations of natural output have little, if any, influence on long run 
growth, as there is no reason for supply side determinants to be affected by 
temporary deviations from the optimal path. 
The New Keynesian theory that lies beneath the New Consensus only allows 
temporary deviations from equilibrium within a framework in which market forces 
spontaneously tend, if left alone, towards a first (or second) best that constitutes the best of 
all possible worlds. In this sense the pendulum of output determination is much closer to 
the neoclassical supply-side theory than to the Keynesian demand-side view. Like the 
neoclassical synthesis that grew out of the IS-LM model (see Section 2.2.1), it relies 
exclusively on rigidities to determine short-term departures from the long run natural 
equilibrium. 
In particular, the New Consensus embraces the RBC rejection of sustained and 
persistent excesses of full employment over the natural rate, and of savings over 
investment, which were the central feature of Keynes’ General Theory (1936). Precisely 
the impossibility of generating such persistent demand shortages, explains the fact that, 
after the crisis the New Consensus has been challenged in many quarters, including by 
economists that contributed to its development (see Section 5). 
While monetary policy may play some role in smoothing the cycle, the New 
Consensus removed fiscal policy, even in the short run, from the set of tools available to 
policy makers. Theoretical and empirical work on fiscal policy, therefore, focused on the 
design of “optimal” rules aimed at preventing opportunistic behaviours and excessive 
(distortionary) weight of the government in the economy. 
2.3.1 Fiscal Rules 
Fiscal rules may take different forms and arrangements, depending on the 
institutional setting and on the objective they are meant to serve. They may target the 
headline deficit, or focus on structural figures, thus focusing public finances on the 
business cycle. They may constrain expenditure, or focus on the long term debt objective. 
Finally, they may distinguish between different types of expenditure, like the “Golden 
Rule” that is meant to preserve public investment. A discussion of the different types of 
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rules is beyond the scope of this paper12, which focuses on the EMU, and on challenges for 
the New Consensus coming from the crisis. 
What is a “good” fiscal rule? In a seminal paper, Kopits and Symansky (1998) 
enumerate a set of criteria to assess the quality of fiscal rules, later amended by Buiter 
(2003) to take into account the specificities of monetary unions. These criteria can be seen 
as stemming (i) from political economy considerations (rules need to be clear, transparent, 
simple, neutral with respect to political preferences on the size of the public sector, and 
enforceable); or (ii) from economic efficiency considerations (rules need to be consistent, 
sustainable, flexible, and respectful of institutional variety across countries). 
Kopits and Symansky acknowledge that no rule could fulfill all the criteria at the 
same time, as some trade-offs between them are inevitable. We will see in Section 4 that in 
the EMU, transparency and enforceability were favoured over flexibility and simplicity 
respectively (Buti et al., 2003). Other choices, as the “Golden Rule”13 may favour 
flexibility at the expense of simplicity. 
These trade-offs are often less evident than one might think. Transparency, clarity 
and enforceability, for example, may come at the expense of some degree of discretion 
which might, under reasonable circumstances, help to stabilize the economy after a shock 
has occurred. Similarly, simplicity may be obtained at the expenses of adequacy and, in a 
monetary union, variety. If needed, a “complex rule” should not be scrapped on the ground 
that it is difficult to sell to the public. And conversely, an inadequate fiscal rule would not 
be made better by the fact that it is easily understandable. 
The New Consensus shaped the European institutions that were put in place with the 
Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. As we will see below (Section 4), the Treaty 
centralized European economic governance on the rejection of active macroeconomic 
policies. By contrast, in the United States, the Full Employment and Balanced Budget Act 
of 1978 (the Humphrey-Hawkins Act) amended the Federal Reserve Act in establishing a 
dual objective of price stability and full employment for monetary policy. At the same 
time, attempts to introduce a fiscal rule for the US Government have never been 
successful. This is not surprising as the US Federal government has an important 
stabilization role to play in absorbing asymmetric shocks hitting the states that, with the 
exception of Vermont, have very strict fiscal rules. 
I will argue in the next section that this institutional setting may have played a role 
in explaining the relatively poor performance of the EMU before and during the crisis. 
                                                         
12 The interested reader can find a complete account, including a theoretical discussion in Wyplosz (2012). 
Ray et al. (2015) and Tanzi (2015) discuss the issue with a special focus on developing countries, with the 
former taking a rather critical stance. 
13 For a discussion of the Golden Rule, see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004), and more recently Creel et al. 
(2009), Creel et al. (2013), Derviş and Saraceno (2014), and Truger (2015). For a critical view, see 
Balassone and Franco (2000). 
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3. The USA vs the EMU: Different policies for different outcomes 
3.1 Chasing the United States 
The two largest world economies, the United States and the Economic and 
Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU), constitute a convenient natural 
experiment in that they have similar economic “fundamentals” (productivity, wealth, 
financial structure), but also different institutional settings. In particular, as we’ll see 
below, while in the EMU fiscal policy is constrained by a rule, in the US fiscal 
authorities retain full discretion. 
Since 1999, the EMU has had a more stable macroeconomic environment: inflation 
was slightly lower than in the United States, the exchange rate less volatile, and external 
imbalances small. But the relative success of the EMU in targeting nominal variables 
was paid in terms of a significantly worse economic performance, with a cumulative 
comparative loss of per capita GDP of more than 20 percentage points over the whole 
period (Figure 1a). If we look in particular at unemployment, the United States has 
outperformed the EMU since 1992 (Figure 1b). True, the rate increased remarkably more 
with the crisis; but since then it has decreased to pre-crisis levels. 
Figure 1. EMU vs the USA (1992-2016) 
(a) Per Capita GDP (1992=100) 
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(b) Unemployment Rates 
 
Source: European Commission (2017). 
The US economic model has problems that just a casual look at some macro 
variables cannot account for (instability and inequality, just to name two). Furthermore, it 
is well known that its unemployment rate decreased in part because of the decline in 
labour force participation (a phenomenon on that nevertheless can be observed in Europe 
as well). But it is undeniable that, from a macroeconomic viewpoint, it showed strong 
dynamism and resilience during the crisis that the EMU has cruelly lacked. 
The Consensus highlights US market flexibility as an explanation for the difference 
in performance. The excessive rigidity of EMU markets, in particular labour markets, is a 
drag on firms’ dynamism and willingness to hire workers. Tackling this rigidity would 
therefore reduce the distortions to incentives and ensure convergence towards a first best 
equilibrium. 
It is hard to deny that labour and product markets in the Eurozone could be 
streamlined and made more efficient. Yet, available evidence is somewhat at odds with 
the Consensus narrative that reforms are all that is needed to improve economic 
performance. 
In particular, if we look at labour markets, the Consensus narrative does not take into 
account recent developments. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL) index, computed by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), over the recent decades. The EPL index, as 
imperfect as it is, may be taken as a broad measure of labour market flexibility (large 
numbers indicating more rigid labour markets)14. While it is true that most European 
countries have high index values, it is also true that they experienced drastic reductions 
                                                         
14 The OECD reports two indexes of employment protection: one for regular contracts and one for temporary 
contracts. I averaged the two to obtain an overall index. 
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in the past years; many of them since the Maastricht Treaty was signed, some others 
when forced by the crisis. 
Figure 2. Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) Index: Period Averages (1985-2013) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD (2017). 
Furthermore, besides a shrinking pool of protected workers, EMU countries have an 
increasing share of workers covered by multiple types of contract (such as part-time) that 
are highly flexible. Thus, while average labour protection may still be larger than in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, marginal protection is by no means different. Firms wanting to 
smooth business cycle fluctuations by modifying labour utilization can easily do so. 
Thus, labour market rigidities can hardly be seen as an obstacle for European businesses 
to compete. 
More generally, evidence on institutions and labour market performance is weak and 
often contradictory so that the most cautious authors studying the subject have to 
conclude that, for example, “the broadbrush analysis that says that European 
unemployment is high because European labour markets are ‘rigid’ is too vague and 
probably misleading” (Nickell, 1997: p. 73). Paradoxically, the only convincing 
conclusion to emerge from the wide array of studies devoted to the subject is that no 
single labour market institutional setting proves to be superior to others and that success 
is determined by the interaction of institutions with country-specific factors (Freeman, 
2000). 
To sum up, while still popular in policy circles and in the media, the Consensus 
narrative seems to have little support from the data. The opposition of the “flexible” 
United States and “rigid” European countries, seems more like a snapshot of the past 
than a feature of the present. While too much emphasis is given to the Consensus 
narrative, another difference between the Eurozone and the United States is too often 
neglected: policy activism. 
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3.2 A tale of policy inertia 
While American policy makers, regardless of their partisan affiliation, never gave 
up the active management of the business cycle, in Europe macroeconomic policy never 
made it into the policy-maker’s toolbox. The Consensus, embedded in European 
institutions and practices since the early 1990s, led European governments to give up 
active management of the business cycle, and to engage in a non-cooperative strategy 
through fiscal and social competition. Even before the global financial crisis hit the 
world economy, the inertia of European policy makers in comparison with their 
counterparts across the ocean was striking. Let us start from monetary policy. 
Figure 3. Monetary policy: EMU vs the USA 
(a) Short term interest rate (1999-2016) 
 
(b) Central bank total assets (2007-2015, Dec 07=100) 
 
Source: Datastream (2017). 
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Figure 3a shows that since the creation of the euro the European Central Bank 
(ECB) has not acted as aggressively as the Federal Reserve (the Fed) to smooth the cycle. 
While in the United States rates went from high to low rather quickly, the ECB followed 
with a lag, and with more timid rate changes. This is most striking for the current crisis, as 
the ECB decided to slash rates later than the Fed. Nor is the difference limited to 
conventional monetary policy. Figure 3b shows the evolution of Fed and ECB balance 
sheets since the end of 2007. The much discussed ECB Quantitative Easing program 
clearly pales if compared to the behaviour of the Fed that once more acted earlier and more 
boldly. 
There is little doubt that the ECB was substantially less proactive than the Fed, both 
before and during the crisis. This restraint could nevertheless be explained by the need for 
the ECB to compensate for excessively lax fiscal policies in the Eurozone. This argument 
does not hold, nevertheless, if we look at Figure 4, which shows the fiscal impulse15 of the 
EMU in comparison with the US and the OECD average. Like for central bank rates, the 
figure is most striking for the differences in variation, with the standard error of the fiscal 
impulse in the EMU being only slightly more than half the value for the United States. The 
higher reactivity of American fiscal authorities is not surprising if we consider that the 
United States has a lower level of social protection and of automatic stabilization, which 
calls for a more active role of macroeconomic policies aimed at limiting the effects of 
harmful fluctuations of income (Creel and Saraceno, 2010a). 
 
Figure 4. Fiscal Impulse (1999-2015; means and standard errors also reported) 
 
Source: OECD (2017). 
                                                         
15 The fiscal impulse is computed as the negative of year-on-year changes in cyclically adjusted government 
net lending. It measures the discretionary fiscal stance of the country, a positive number denoting an 
expansionary period. 
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But there is more than that. The EMU policy inertia is related to the institutions for 
macroeconomic governance that were created when the New Consensus dominated 
academic and policy circles alike. The constraints to policy activism, therefore, are a 
defining feature of the EMU as it came to existence in Maastricht in 1992. 
4. European fiscal governance 
4.1 From Maastricht to the Fiscal Compact, via the Stability and Growth 
Pact 
The theory of currency unions (Mundell, 1961) assigns to monetary authorities the 
task of reacting to common shocks setting the interest rate in order to maximize some 
union-wide objective function (usually obtained by averaging the national objective 
functions). The optimal monetary policy response to idiosyncratic shocks is to “do 
nothing” (Lane, 2000), leaving the task to national fiscal policies, that remain 
decentralized. 
The institutions of Europe, in their actual design, stem from two main sources. The 
first is the founding Treaty signed in Maastricht in 1991, and the second is the Stability and 
Growth Pact that, negotiated together with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, completes the 
setup for fiscal policy. 
The Maastricht Treaty defined the convergence criteria that countries had to fulfil in 
order to be admitted to the single currency area. In particular, it required a deficit to GDP 
ratio of no more than 3 per cent, and a public debt below 60 per cent of GDP, or 
approaching that level at a “satisfactory pace”. The vagueness of the latter requirement 
allowed to overlook it for high debt countries such as Belgium, Greece and Italy. 
Approaching the starting date of 1999, the problem was posed of how to make the 
accession criteria permanent, i.e. valid once the single currency had become a reality. The 
Amsterdam Council of 1997 put in place the Stability and Growth Pact which coordinates 
fiscal policy in the Eurozone “from the bottom”, and was designed with the explicit 
objective to ban discretionary fiscal policy, and to lay the burden of adjustment on the 
operation of automatic stabilizers (Buti and Giudice, 2002). According to its provisions, 
each Member Country had to achieve the objective of a medium-term balanced budget, 
while the deficit in any given year needed not to be above the 3 per cent Maastricht 
threshold. The requirement to attain a position of close to balance or surplus in the medium 
term was an important innovation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) with respect to 
the Maastricht Treaty. In fact, it implied the strong consequence that public debt as a ratio 
to GDP should tend asymptotically to zero, a position hard to justify per se. The 
Amsterdam Treaty also defined an “excessive deficit procedure” which gives the 
Commission the power to propose sanctions against any country that exceeded the limit. 
After a first reform in 2005, the European crisis paved the way for a new set of 
reforms of the European fiscal rules. On 2 March2012, 25 of the 27 EU countries (the 
Czech Republic and the United Kingdom did not sign) adopted the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union that entered into 
force on 1 January 2013. This so-called Fiscal Compact tightened the provisions of the 
SGP: the limit of public deficit at 3 per cent of GDP has been supplemented with a limit on 
structural deficit at 0.5 per cent of GDP, and an average yearly reduction by 1/20th of the 
difference between the debt to GDP ratio and the 60 per cent of GDP Maastricht limit. The 
limit on structural deficit goes beyond the SGP provisions, in that it aims at introducing 
balanced budget constraints at the constitutional level for each Eurozone Member State. 
These tighter rules have been complemented by a strengthened surveillance mechanism, 
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the “European Semester”: the Commission interacts with Member Countries all along the 
budgetary process, to enhance surveillance, and enforcement of fiscal discipline. 
4.2 The SGP and the Fiscal Compact: Good fiscal rules? 
The discussion on fiscal rules and in particular on the Stability and Growth Pact, 
never faded, even before the crisis. 
Attempts were made to try to assess the European fiscal rule against Kopits and 
Symansky’s (1998) criteria enunciated above (see p. 20). Buti et al. (2003) concluded that 
the EMU fiscal rule did fare rather well in terms of the criteria, so that only slight 
modifications would be needed. According to them, the two most important drawbacks of 
the SGP were lack of enforceability and of consistency. 
Creel and Saraceno (2010b) took a more critical stance, noticing how the SGP was 
inconsistent as it lacked the incentives for governments to take benefit of upswings to 
increase public surplus or to implement fiscal reforms (“all stick and no carrot” – Bean, 
1998: p. 106). 
Creel and Saraceno further argued that the SGP relies on an intrinsically difficult 
concept like “structural deficit” that, while economically meaningful, relies on estimates of 
potential output that are uncertain. The argument in Fall 2014 between the Italian 
Government and the Commission on the estimate of the output gap is a good case in point. 
This entails insufficient clarity and transparency of the SGP, which falls short of two 
important criteria put forward by Kopits and Symansky. Furthermore, the Commission is 
endowed of the power to identify “significant divergences” from medium term objectives, 
where the identification of what is and is not significant is left to the Commission’s 
discretion. We thus learned in the Spring of 2015 that in the framework of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, Germany’s current account surplus was not 
“excessive” even if larger than the threshold set by the European norms. 
The original SGP had some flexibility, in that the power to impose sanctions stayed 
with the Council that decided based on political considerations. But this came at the price 
of reduced enforceability and credibility16. With the crisis, and the subsequent tightening of 
the rules introduced by the Fiscal Compact, this was corrected and now sanctions are 
automatic unless the Council blocks them with a qualified majority. This of course reduced 
flexibility, a practical demonstration of the already mentioned trade-offs implied by Kopits 
and Symansky’s crieria. 
Interestingly enough, the recent difficulties of the Eurozone economy, and the 
backslash against austerity, have induced the Commission to take a more active role in 
according flexibility to countries, if associated to significant efforts in implementing 
reforms, managing emergencies such as the refugee crisis, and so on. This increased 
flexibility nevertheless comes at the price of increased arbitrariness, and a further reduction 
of clarity and transparency. 
More importantly, the crisis has highlighted other important flaws of the fiscal 
framework. First, it does not seem to have guaranteed the convergence of crisis countries 
to sustainable finances. As we write (March 2017), in spite of austerity (probably because 
                                                         
16 The clash between the Council and the Commission, when the former refused to trigger an Excessive 
Deficit Procedure for France and Germany in 2003, represents one of the most serious institutional crises of 
the EU. 
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of austerity, see Section 5) in all peripheral countries, the debt-to-GDP ratio has barely 
been stabilized. The philosophy of the SGP was to achieve coordination of fiscal policies 
“from the bottom” through adherence to the rule. The “one-size-fits-all” feature of the SGP 
created two problems related to consistency: the first is that fiscal policies ended up being 
synchronized rather than coordinated. All the countries implemented austerity, even those 
who had a margin to run expansionary policies. The result is that fiscal policy for the 
Eurozone as a whole since 2010 has been pro-cyclical at worse and neutral at best, in spite 
of persisting negative output gaps (Figure 5). Second, and as a consequence of this harmful 
and inertial fiscal stance, the ECB had to step in the picture somewhat reluctantly in order 
to minimize the damage, at least in terms of stability (Saraceno, 2016a). Besides the 
inefficiency of having to rely on monetary policy in a liquidity trap situation, this has also 
highlighted the inconsistency of the macroeconomic governance mechanism. 
Figure 5. EMU Fiscal Impulse and Output Gap (2008-2015) 
 
Source: OECD (2017). 
Second, it is true that the letter of the rule respects the neutrality criterion, as nothing 
in the SGP (and Fiscal Compact) calls for specific measures on government size and on the 
reach of national welfare states. But the actual practice is in fact different. For example, 
creditors’ demands in the bailout negotiations with Greece, and general public statements 
regarding macroeconomic policy from the ECB and the Commission, constantly call for a 
downsizing of the public sector and a reduction in pensions, healthcare services, and so on. 
The implementation of the rule, therefore, is a clear application of the New Consensus 
(Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2013). In light of these considerations, it is hard to share Buti et 
al.’s (2003) conclusion that the European fiscal framework just needs minor adjustments. 
The 2000s, and the crisis that started in 2008, clearly show that EMU fiscal rule are 
deficient in almost all the criteria listed by Kopits and Symansky. 
But the EMU fiscal framework has deeper problems than simply being “non 
optimal”. First, and without even questioning the reasons for the breach, the 3 per cent-of-
GDP target for public deficit has been regularly exceeded by EU countries since 1999 
when the SGP started being enforced. Wyplosz (2012: p. 23) argues that a rule which is 
breached so frequently by so many countries does not act as a binding rule. Fitoussi and 
Saraceno (2008) argue that, on the contrary, even if the European fiscal rules never yielded 
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actual sanctions in spite of the numerous infringements, their very existence was capable of 
constraining governments’ action through peer pressure and the general reprobation 
attached to fiscal (and monetary) activism. Second, in some countries creative accounting 
has been implemented in order to circumvent excessive deficit. Third, the lengthy EMU 
procedures have been exploited strategically by governments: fiscal plans and 
implemented budgetary policies have been at odds, counting on the cumbersome 
sanctioning procedure. Fourth, by focusing on annual budgets the SGP overlooks all the 
intertemporal issues linked to fiscal policy. These range from investment expenditures, 
whose return is spread over long periods (so the same should hold for the cost), to the 
smoothing over different years of the adjustment costs linked to a downturn, or to current 
expenditures whose effects may be felt in the future (e.g. education). By imposing limits in 
terms of annual accounting, the SGP eliminates any intertemporal smoothing of fiscal 
policy. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) further argue that the lack of intertemporal 
considerations may be doubly harmful, by forcing governments to postpone structural 
reforms (namely of the pension system) that would yield benefits only in the medium-to-
long run while imposing a short term burden on public finances (cuts in public system 
contributions in order to allow financing of private pension schemes). The new 
“flexibility” taking into account reform efforts has softened, but not eliminated, the 
problem. 
5. Shaking the consensus: The crisis and secular stagnation 
The Consensus emphasis on monetary policy led most countries, when the crisis 
began in 2007-2008, to favour monetary policy to try to contrast the recession. It is only 
when in 2009 the economy became trapped in the liquidity trap (see page 10), and 
monetary policy lost traction, that fiscal stimulus plans were implemented by advanced and 
emerging economies alike. The coordinated fiscal expansion was fruitful, and is credited 
with triggering the recovery (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2009). But as soon as the acute 
phase of the crisis was over, the fear of deficits and debt caused a quick reversal of the 
policy stance. The turn towards austerity was particularly brutal in Europe, where the crisis 
in peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) was interpreted as a fiscal 
profligacy story, and therefore “cured” with fiscal consolidation. 
The austerity plans put in place in peripheral Europe where grounded on the New 
Consensus belief that fiscal multipliers, the impact of government deficit on economic 
activity were rather low, certainly lower than one, and probably around 0.5. Thus, austerity 
was estimated to be only mildly recessionary in the short run17, and expansionary in the 
long run when the government withdrawal from the economy would unleash the potential 
of the economy. 
Events did not unfold as planned: the fiscal stance reversal slowed down the 
recovery world- wide, and in the Eurozone austerity plunged the economy in a double dip 
recession from which it has not yet fully recovered. 
The recession, and the slow and uncertain recovery that followed, have shaken the 
New Consensus, most notably in its limited faith in policy effectiveness. The reassessment 
                                                         
17 Some even claimed that austerity would be expansionary in the short-run as well, drawing on the literature 
started by the seminal work of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) on expansionary fiscal consolidations. The fact 
that this literature has been shown to be very country-specific, and substantially proven wrong, was 
neglected by partisans of fiscal consolidation. 
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of the Consensus is ongoing, and it touches many of its tenets. From the role of capital 
mobility (see, e.g., Ostry et al., 2016), to the importance of public debt (IMF, 2016), to the 
timing and design of structural reforms (Rodrik, 2013; Eggertsson et al., 2014). 
For the purpose of this paper we will focus on the reassessment of the Consensus 
dismissal of fiscal policy. Two ongoing discussions are worth mentioning: the debate on 
the size of multipliers, and the one on the permanent costs of austerity. 
5.1 How large are fiscal multipliers? 
In 2012, the IMF made the headlines with a box in its fall edition of the World 
Economic Outlook that was later developed by its chief economist Olivier Blanchard 
(Blanchard and Leigh 2013). The IMF made an outright mea culpa on the size of the 
multipliers, arguing that in a deep downturn with monetary policy at the zero lower bound, 
their size was closer to 2 than to the value of 0.5 that they had previously estimated. As a 
consequence, the contractionary impact of fiscal consolidation (in particular in Europe) had 
been larger than anticipated, and the recession made austerity, not only more costly, but 
also self-defeating with respect to the objective to reduce the debt ratios. 
The multiplier per se is a vague term. In the literature it may be taken to measure the 
impact of public expenditure, or of public deficit, on the level of activity, or on other 
variables such as employment, industrial production or consumption. Furthermore, it may 
be computed over different time horizons, from the multiplier on impact, to the long-term 
multiplier computed as the cumulated effects over time. 
Empirical work on the multiplier size in “normal times” is far from being 
consensual18. The meta-analyses of Gechert and Will (2012) and Gechert (2015) manage to 
extract from the abundant literature a number of broad conclusions: 
1.   First, public expenditure multipliers are close to 1 (so significantly larger than the 
0.5 value that was taken as a basis of fiscal consolidation programs in crisis 
Eurozone countries). 
2.   Second, consistent with the standard textbook argument, the spending multipliers 
are larger than tax and transfer multipliers. 
3.   Finally public investment multipliers are even larger than overall expenditure 
multipliers. 
Nevertheless, these average values hide a very strong variability that depends among 
other things from the type of underlying theoretical model. Keynesian macroeconomic 
models yield substantially larger multiplier effects on average than Real Business Cycle 
(RBC) based estimates that allow no influence of demand factors on GDP growth. DSGE 
models, that blend an RBC structure with various short-term rigidities, allow for demand 
shocks to have an impact in the short term. It is not surprising then, that the empirical 
estimation of the multiplier, within this framework, rests between the two extremes of the 
Keynesian and the RBC model. 
It is interesting to note, nevertheless, that the variability can be found even among 
estimates obtained with the same theoretical foundations. The reason for this variability is 
that, regardless of the theoretical model that is chosen, the value of the multiplier crucially 
depends on a number of factors, most notably the degree of openness of the economy, and 
                                                         
18 For some recent work, reaching opposite conclusions see e.g. Perotti (2011) and Alesina et al. (2015). 
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the size of the output gap. Regarding the latter, the debate on the effectiveness of 
macroeconomic policy often neglects the fact that Keynesian theory only applies when 
there is slack in the economy, i.e. when there are idle resources that public expenditure can 
mobilize (see Section 2.1.2). During a recession, furthermore, a number of New Consensus 
features of the economy will play a role. For example, the number of liquidity constrained 
households and firms, who cannot smooth consumption, will increase (DeLong and 
Summers, 2012), thus making the value of the multiplier larger. On the other hand, if the 
economy is at full employment, in Keynesian as much as in Neoclassical theory, the value 
of the multiplier will be zero, and crowding out complete. 
Attempts to estimate a time-varying value for the multiplier that depends on the 
cyclical position of the economy are not numerous. Using US data and a regime-switching 
SVAR model à la Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) find 
large differences in the size of spending multipliers in recessions and expansions with 
fiscal policy (in particular military spending) being considerably more effective in 
recessions. Creel et al. (2011) find similar results using a structural Keynesian model on 
French data: when the output gap is significantly negative, the value of the multiplier is 
larger than one. Consistently with the theory on the other hand, when the economy is 
instead close to potential, the model gives significantly lower estimates of the multiplier. 
Since the seminal work of Aschauer (1989), public investment has been considered 
to have a double role of short-term aggregate demand support, and long run productivity 
and growth contributor. Bom and Ligthart’s (2014) meta-analysis shows that estimates of 
public investment multipliers exhibit the same degree of variability as the broader 
multiplier estimates seen above. This is not surprising, as it takes time, for public capital to 
become operational and contribute to total factor productivity (Leeper et al., 2010). Thus, 
depending on how the time to build is accounted for in the estimation exercise and in the 
underlying theoretical model, the multiplier may change significantly. 
In general, and consistent with economic intuition, the multiplier increases in size 
with larger productivity of public capital, and with shorter time to build. In these cases, the 
positive short-term demand shock is quickly associated with a positive supply-side impact 
on productivity. This is because, while in normal conditions the positive demand shock 
triggers a central bank reaction, the subsequent impact on supply is deflationary, making 
central bank intervention milder or unnecessary, thus amplifying even the short-run 
multiplier. 
Depressed interest rates at times of crisis also give another argument for stimulus 
through fiscal investment: borrowing costs are low, and the depleted public (and private) 
capital stock during the crisis make investment particularly productive, and the multiplier 
large. This is why, based on a large sample of developing and advanced countries, the 
(IMF, 2014) recently spoke of “free lunches”: public investment would lift the economy 
out of the crisis and via its impact of growth, also reduce public debt. 
5.2 The permanent costs of austerity 
Are there circumstances in which changes in aggregate demand can have an 
appreciable, persistent effect on aggregate supply? (Yellen 2016). 
Fiscal consolidation and the implementation of reforms had stronger than expected 
recessionary effects, most notably in Europe. This did not soften the Consensus’ emphasis 
on austerity and reform, as the recession was interpreted as a necessary short-term side 
effect of the policies put in place to increase the potential growth rate of the economy. This 
interpretation rested on the Consensus separation between short and long run, with demand 
side factors only affecting the former, and supply side policies having an impact on the 
latter (see p. 19). The Consensus conventional wisdom would argue that the reduction of 
aggregate demand and the ensuing recession triggered by austerity and reforms would be a 
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short-term pain which would in no way affect the long-term gain represented by the effect 
of reforms and government downsizing. 
Nevertheless, the severity of the recession has cast doubt as of whether the economy 
was going through a simple cyclical downturn. Economists have therefore started asking 
whether the economy will ever be able to recover its past levels of output. On one side, the 
discussion on secular stagnation highlighted the reasons why the growth rates of the 1950s-
1970s might not materialize again. On the other side, economists emphasized how 
prolonged periods of crisis may dent physical and human capital, causing a permanent 
damage to the economy. 
In particular, DeLong and Summers (2012) revive an old intuition by Blanchard and 
Summers (1986), which highlights the role of hysteresis in explaining long-term 
unemployment: workers who stay unemployed long enough will start losing their human 
capital. Thus, when these workers eventually find a new job, they will be less productive. 
The result is a permanently lower capacity of the economy to produce. DeLong and 
Summers (2012) conclude that too strong fiscal austerity may yield permanently lower 
future output by throwing too many people out of work, and thus end up being self-
defeating also in the long run. 
Fàtas and Summers (2015) provide empirical support for this claim, as they find that 
short-run shocks to the economy tend to have an impact both on current and potential 
GDP. Among these shocks of course they focus on fiscal consolidations, that at times of 
crisis when multipliers are large, have a particularly strong negative effect on output both 
in the short and in the long run. Thus, Fàtas and Summers concur with the literature that 
argues against fiscal consolidation, adding an additional zest: the bad timing of austerity 
does not only cause unnecessary pain in the short run. It may be self-defeating in the long 
run as well. 
To sum up, the crisis has revived the interest in fiscal policy, an interest that took the 
shape of a renewed debate on the size of fiscal multipliers, and on the impact of austerity 
on potential growth. It is too soon to say whether this body of work will lead to a 
reconsideration of the New Consensus policy prescriptions that had excluded fiscal policy 
from the policy makers’ toolbox. 
6. Conclusion: What Lessons for Developing Economies? 
The New Consensus is built around the hypothesis of market efficiency, and is 
enshrined in European institutions since the Maastricht Treaty. Discretionary policies are 
limited to a bare minimum, while rules and government by technocrats are preferred to 
remove the obstacles towards the Pareto optimal equilibrium of the economy. As posited 
by the underlying theory, EU institutions and practices yielded inertial macroeconomic 
policies, even before the crisis that started in 2008. 
Following the crisis the economics profession is reassessing macroeconomic policy, 
and in particular fiscal policy, well beyond its role in traditional Keynesian short-term 
stabilization. We may be headed towards a long period of “active government” that should 
absorb the private sector excess savings, and contribute to long-term growth with 
investment in private and public capital. The theory of this new role for fiscal policy 
remains to be written. What is certain is that rules like the European Stability and Growth 
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Pact (SGP) will not be able to survive in their current form, were a new paradigm on fiscal 
policy emerge19. 
Most of the literature quoted in this paper is built on evidence drawn from advanced 
economies. In a recent paper, Hory (2015) tries to evaluate whether when dealing with 
emerging economies the picture changes substantially. He concludes that multipliers tend 
to be weaker in emerging economies than in advanced economies, but that the 
determinants of their size are the same (e.g. debt, openness). Thus, Hory concludes, the 
differences between low-income and advanced economies are quantitative rather than 
qualitative. The lessons coming from the literature on advanced countries can therefore be 
applied, with some caution, to developing economies. 
As for fiscal rules, the already cited Ray et al. (2015) wonders whether norms 
tailored on advanced economies are fit for lower-income countries that have recently 
borrowed, especially from the EMU, their fiscal rules. The authors conclude that 
transposing rules from advanced to developing and emerging economies presents two 
major risks: the first is that “many lower-income countries lack the organizational and 
institutional capacity, due to the scarcity of human resources, to establish the strong 
budgeting, reporting and oversight mechanisms necessary to establish and operate effective 
fiscal rules.” (Ray et al., 2015: p. 11). The second is that excessive focus on fiscal 
discipline may yield pro-cyclical fiscal policy, and make it harder to reach development 
objectives such as poverty reduction, employment friendly growth, the reduction of income 
inequality, or the construction of a properly working welfare state. 
The conclusions of this paper regarding fiscal policy, therefore, seem to be even 
more relevant when the focus is on low-income and emerging countries. While its 
effectiveness is some- what reduced by weak institutions, fiscal policy is all the more 
necessary. Emerging economies should use fiscal policy when necessary to do so, while 
working at ways to improve the efficiency of both current public expenditure and public 
investment. Similarly, the adoption of fiscal rules should be carefully assessed for 
countries where the objective of fiscal discipline risks not only to be at odds with 
macroeconomic stabilization, like in advanced countries, but also and more importantly 
with the attainment of development goals. 
                                                         
19 For an analysis of the implication of secular stagnation on the conduct of fiscal policy, especially in 
Europe, see Saraceno (2016b). 
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